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Abstract: After 2007 Romania became one of the eastern frontier states of the European Union. 
This double status of national state and frontier state comes itself with both the responsibility of keeping a 
high level of security for the EU’s border, and at the same time it can be seen as an opportunity for the 
Romanian state of increasing its regional power inside and outside the organization. At the same time, the 
Eastern non-EU member states seemed to be caught in the middle between the Russian Federation and the 
EU, fact that affected their national security level and tended to create a fragmentation within the EU. After 
its integration in the European structures, Romania’s strategy was constructed around the aspect of 
supporting and promoting the Republic of Moldova’s EU integration. The present paper analyses this 
double status of Romania and its possible effects.  
Key-words: Romania, Republic of Moldova, Russia, Eastern frontier, security, national interest / 
preference. 
 
Introduction  
The EU is passing through a period of transition, during which, both state and non-state 
players are involved in a process of adaptation to the new security realities that appeared closer 
after Eastern enlargement process. The new member states that represent the new eastern 
frontier line of the Union have to fit in with their double status: they are national states that have 
to defend their national interests or to negotiate their own national preferences with other 
national players, but at the same time they are member states of the EU and have to protect and 
promote the interest of the entire organization in their relationships with the outside players. 
Additionally, in 2004 Romania became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), moment from which Romania started to represent the frontier line of the eastern 
dimension of this organization, too.  
The present paper’s hypothesis consists of identifying the responsibility and opportunities 
of Romania in terms of national interests/national preferences over the Eastern frontier security 
dimension, fact that meets with Romania’s double status: a member of NATO and of the EU. The 
point of this hypothesis is especially important as these national interests/preferences can 
influence positively or negatively the development of the entire Eastern region’s security level, if 
we take into consideration the bilateral relations that this state has developed with countries as 
Moldova and Ukraine. It can also influence the entire organization’s security level if we take into 
consideration eastern states like the Russian Federation, a country with regional capabilities and 
global aspirations.  
From a methodological point of view, there will be made an official direct documents 
analysis (strategies, speeches, treaties, bilateral, multilateral agreements etc.) and indirect 
documents as analysis of the most relevant scholars’ works, conceptual analysis and a theoretical 
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approach that is adequate for the development of a glibly analysis over the Romanian state’s 
behaviour and attitudes towards specific events. 
Theoretical approach  
In what regards the theoretical analysis, there are some fundamental concepts like: 
national interest, national preferences, and security that need to be defined, framed within their 
theoretical approaches and analysed accordingly for then to be subjected to a practical analysis on 
the specific case of Romania. 
The concept of national interest is functioning under the realist and neo-realist logic that 
considers alliances as the most suitable forms of security for a national state1. The realist scholars 
believe that national states are central elements of the international system. Even within 
international organizations, that are mostly intergovernmental, states hold the most important 
role as they defend and promote their national interests. Morghentau believed that every state 
had its own set of interests, which are established unilaterally, selfishly and most important 
rationally. These national interests are defined in terms of power. The objective of every state is to 
maximize its power and to protect its internal security against external threats. In order to 
understand a state’s foreign policy, it is necessary, first, to understand its national interest as it is 
developed according to some objective variables as: the geographical position of that state, the 
natural resources that are owned by it, governing quality, its diplomacy, its economic, 
technological and military development etc2. States need to act within an international system 
which is anarchic, in the sense of a non-existent international government that is recognized and 
accepted by all states and that can coerce the units (the national state) to act in a certain way3. 
This is a system in which “nobody is legitimate to command and no-one is obliged to obey”4. Being 
the main players of the international arena, states needed a system that is anarchic, because in a 
contrary situation, there would have been a central institution/organization that would have had 
more power and capabilities than them and this could have been perceived as a threat. This 
systemic quality gives states the liberty to act according to their own interests, but at the same 
time it has a coercive character, states being obliged to take into account other state’s interests 
and power before taking any action. 
The security/insecurity of both the system and the states is also important in the realist 
paradigm as: “nothing is undermining more the level of security [......] than the aggregation of 
power in a certain way that produces fear and negative reaction”5. If a state increases its power, 
this action can generate a negative reaction coming from other state as the first’s actions are 
perceived by the second as being an attempt to minimize its power.  
Starting with 1970s Waltz’s neo-realism came into attention. He believes that in order to 
develop a glibly analysis over the international relations we need to make abstraction of every 
state’s attribute (for example a function) and take into consideration only its capabilities. Then, 
states are under the influence of the international system, which is also anarchic. In this way, the 
                                                           
1 Scott Burchill et al. Teorii ale relatiilor internationale. (Iasi: Institutul European, 2008). pp.50-51 
2 Andrei Miroiu et al. Manual de relatii internationale. (Iasi: Polirom, 2006). pp.99-100 
3 Ibidem. p.103 
4 Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of international politics. (Iasi: Polirom, 2006). p.88 
5 Stefano Guzzini. Realism si relatii internationale: povestea fara sfîrsit a unei morti anuntate: realismul în relatiile 
internationale si în economia politica internationala. (Iasi: Institutul European, 2000). p.93 
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units or the states are put in two possible situations: they can subordinate to other states that 
have more capabilities, or try to rule others1. The number of the states, which have sufficient 
capabilities in order to be defined as great powers, is defining the international order at a certain 
moment. This order is not fixed or unchangeable, but it is always reacting to the pressures of the 
anarchic international system and of the states that are within it. Those countries are in a 
continuous race for power, race that is supported by the relative character of power, which most 
likely has a zero sum result2. For example, during the Cold War, the USA and the USSR have 
created a bipolar international system. After the disbandment of USSR, this order was replaced by 
a unipolar system, in which USA was the sole state that had the most developed capabilities, thus 
holding the hegemony of the system3. Nowadays, the international order is passing through a 
period of transition as it is heading towards a multipolar or a non-polar system, in which more and 
more states will get involved in the process of influencing, establishing and developing the current 
and the future international order. 
In what regards the structure of the international system, in the case of neo-realism it is 
also anarchic, as Waltz believes that “international structure emerges from the interaction of 
states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others”4. 
This anarchic character of the international system is determining the attitudes and states’ 
behaviour, creating the situation in which every state has to defend its national interest as no 
other entity is going to do this for it. In this way, states “at minimum, seek their own preservation”, 
thus they want to maintain their current position in which they can protect their independency, 
sovereignty and their autonomy. At the opposite side, states “at maximum, drive for universal 
domination”, but “survival, however, is not a small quantity of domination, nor is domination a 
surplus of survival”5. At the same time, Waltz argues that states want to obtain some strategic 
advantages or they may want to peacefully co-exist with other states, something that can be 
achieved through the membership of alliances, especially for those states that do not have the 
necessary capabilities for them to be called great powers or regional powers6. This is the case of 
the Romanian state, which has chosen to enter NATO, in order to obtain some strategic benefits 
and to protect its security, especially if we take into consideration the inefficient and unproductive 
bilateral relations between it and the Russian Federation. Therefore we can claim that in this 
situation Romania tried to balance Russia’s power using NATO’s capabilities. It has to be added the 
fact that the geographical position held by Romania (at the intersection point between Central 
Europe, Black Sea region, Caucasus, South Europe and Central Asia) was mainly producing a state 
of insecurity, both at internal and external level7. Taking into account all these elements plus the 
                                                           
1 Cit in Scott Burchill et al. Teorii ale relatiilor internationale. (Iasi: Institutul European, 2008). pp.50-51 
2 Cit in Scott Burchill et al. Theories of International Relations. Third edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 
http://gendocs.ru/docs/35/34939/conv_1/file1.pdf accessed on 15 June 2012. pp.35, 65 
3 Ioan Horga, “Impreial Trends in the Global International Society”, in S. Sipos, Mircea Brie, I. Horga, I. Sarov, I. 
Gumenai, Politici imperiale in Estul si vestul spatiului romanesc, Editura Universitatii din Oradea, Editura Cartdidact 
Chisinau 1, 2010, pp. 525-534 
4 Ibidem. p.35 
5 Ibidem. p.42 
6 Ibidem. p.42 
7 Constantin Moştoflei et al. Romania membru al Aliantei Nord Atlantice (Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii Naţionale de 
Apărare, 2004) http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_carti/romania_membru_al_aliantei.pdf .accesed on 15 January 2011. p.15 
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lack of national capabilities for Romania in order to become a regional power that was able to 
establish or at least negotiate with Russia for a stable and secure balance of power within the 
Eastern region, NATO became the solution for it in order to protect its national interests, 
especially in what regards the military capabilities that some of the allies posed at the alliance’s 
disposal1. Being a rational state, under the neo-realist paradigm, Romania made a cost-benefit 
analysis and considered that it was too expensive from a security point of view to ensure by itself 
its national sovereignty and independency, taking into account the period of political transition 
that Romania was passing2.  
At the other side the concept of national preferences was developed under the liberalism 
paradigm, especially under the institutionalist neo-liberalism one. Its scholars promote the legal 
integrated communities as a form of state’s preferred security, as for example, the European 
Union. Coming back to the concept of national preferences, it can be defined as an ordered and 
weighted set of values that aims future background outcomes3. This concept was developed 
mainly by Andrew Moravcsik, who also believed that states are rational entities, capable of making 
a cost-benefit analysis from which to extract the best possible outcome, both in terms of security 
and economy. But, he differentiates himself from the neo-realist paradigm, because he assumes 
the fact that national governments reach to this decision only after they have passed through 
what Putnam called the “two level games”4 (at domestic and international level). In this situation 
the governments, after the internal decision-making process ends, establish the national interest 
of that specific state. Once established, this interest is structured in national preferences and 
together with the position of that state vis-a-vis some other states, some international 
organizations or vis-a-vis some external event, is defended and promoted at the negotiations that 
take place at the international level5. This is the fundamental distinction between the two 
paradigms: if in the case of realism and neo-realism the national interest is something given by 
external factors as the anarchic character of the international system, the geographical position of 
that state or its capabilities and until some point this interest is fixed (every state wants to defend 
and increase its national security), in the case of neo-liberalism the national preference is not 
fixed, being able to vary according to the domestic interests. It is also very important to make a 
distinction between the national interest of the neo-realists’, which is referring mainly to hard 
security and the national preferences which refer more to political and economical aspects6. Then, 
                                                           
1 Coord. Mihail Ionescu. Romania-NATO.Cronologie 1989-2004. (București: Editura Militară, 2004) 
http://www.online.cercetare-aplicata.ro/ro/document/romania-nato-cronologie-1989-2004-editura-militar%C4%83-
bucure%C8%99ti-2004-576-p. accessed on 15 January 2011. p.20 
2 Constantin Moştoflei et al. Romania membru al Aliantei Nord Atlantice. (Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii Naţionale de 
Apărare, 2004). http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_carti/romania_membru_al_aliantei.pdf accessed on 15 January 2011. 
p.40 
3 Andrew Moravcsik. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998). p.24 
4 Robert D. Putnam. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”. International Organization, 
Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2706785.pdf?acceptTC=true 
accessed on 15 June 2012. p.434 
5 Theories of European integration. http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199544813/bache3e_ch01.pdf accessed on 
15 June 2012. pp.12-13 
6 Cit in Scott Burchill et al. Theories of International Relations. Third edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 
http://gendocs.ru/docs/35/34939/conv_1/file1.pdf accessed on 15 June 2012. p.65 
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these national preferences are further negotiated at international level, as states choose the 
suitable international institution in order to implement them. According to Helen V. Miller, the 
international institutions “can impose their preferences on countries that joint subsequently 
because voting rules privilege the status quo”1. In this case, at the EU’s level, the decision does not 
reflect the will for a common good, but the aggregation of the population’s interests which are 
established at the level of their domestic institutions, which in turn negotiate them further at 
international level.  
Moravcsik believes that these preferences belonging to the national governments are 
represented by the balance between the economic interests present at the domestic level, and 
not by the political interests of some decision makers or by some purely strategic, security reasons 
especially if it is the case of the EU. For him, at the level of such supranational organisations, 
national preferences are predominant. He does not believe in the interest of the organisation per 
se, explaining that the decisions that are taken within such an organisation are the result of the 
negotiations that are taking place between states, which have different sets of national 
preferences. In this situation the aspect that counts the most is not the common will or the 
common good, but the relative bargaining power of a state. Moreover, international organisations 
like the EU exist because states prefer to deliver some parts of their authority/sovereignty in the 
favour of an organisation because they want to be ensured that other states are honouring their 
negotiation engagements, too2. For example, at the level of the EU Romania’s national preferences 
as a member state that is situated at the Eastern Frontier of the organisation can be found in the 
desire to develop positive relations with Moldova or Ukraine or states from the Caucasian Region 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia). Following this logic Romania was a promoter of the Partnerships 
that were signed between the European structures and the afore mentioned countries. If in the 
case of the first two states we can talk about frontier security and securitization reasons that have 
also an economic impact, in the case of the lasts states Romania’s national preferences are mainly 
economic ones.  
Within the liberalist paradigm there was developed the institutionalist neo-liberalism. Its 
scholars concentrated their research on analysing political economy matters. For them also the 
international system is anarchic, states are rational players, but the gains are seen in absolute 
terms, not in relative ones as in the case of neo-realists. This last reason has the capacity to make 
states cooperate more often as they do not perceive each other in competitive terms. They do not 
need to measure their gains by relating to others’ gains; therefore their power does not decrease 
or increases according to other’s power development3. Taking into consideration this undeniable 
chance for cooperation between states, the institutionalist neo-liberalism promotes the role of 
institutions that have the capacity to increase even more the level of cooperation between them4. 
                                                           
1 Helen V. Miller, “Power, Independence and Nonstate Actors in World Politics”, in Helen V. Miller & Andrew 
Moravcsik, Power, Independence and Nonstate Actors in World Politics” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
p.9 
2 Theories of European integration. http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199544813/bache3e_ch01.pdf accessed on 
15 June 2012. pp.13-14 
3 Cit in Scott Burchill et al. Theories of International Relations. Third edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 
http://gendocs.ru/docs/35/34939/conv_1/file1.pdf accessed on 15 June 2012. p.65 
4 Robert Jervis. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation Understanding the Debate. 
http://www.pols.boun.edu.tr/uploads%5Cfiles%5C632.pdf accessed on 15 June 2012. pp.44-45 
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Member states do not perceive themselves as parts of an anarchic international system that oblige 
them to mainly be in competitive situations where everyone has to follow its own national 
interest, which mostly is a conflicting one. In this situation states tend to develop institutions more 
often, because an increased level of safety is given by their stability. Being part of it, a state will be 
less worried about who gains more and who gains less. Defection itself is less probable in this 
situation as the rules and the procedures developed within that institution will make it too costly 
for a state to take it into consideration. Hence, states will choose to cooperate1. An organisation 
that can be analysed through neo-liberalist lens is the European Union. In its case we can hardly 
believe that Germany’s gains are perceived by Romania in relative terms.  
The concept of security was analysed by many scholars, but it represents one of the most 
important ideas of the Copenhagen School. Its scholars, among whom we can find Barry Buzan, 
believe that security as it is understood by the realists and neo-realists is no longer applicable to 
nowadays international relations, because the nature of threats themselves has changed over 
time. In this sense, we no longer have only military security, but also political, economic, societal 
and environmental security2.  
The European Union 
The European Union (EU) is already a classical example of a legally integrated community, 
where states can promote, negotiate and implement their national preferences. The EU started 
from being an economic project, aimed to create a unique market, where member states could 
cooperate at the level of low politics, without having to face impediments like the lack of trust, the 
reluctance of state to cede some of their sovereignty in hard politics etc. In this matter the Euro 
Zone and the Schengen Space were created both being areas where member states can cooperate 
easier. The international system is also viewed in terms of anarchy, therefore states need some 
incentives in order to cooperate and the easiest ones to be obtained are the economic gains. This 
economical space, under a spill over effect created a deeper cooperation among the parties and 
eventually created a legally integrated space. In 2014, the EU is one of the most developed 
international organisations worldwide with 28 member states and other acceding states, in which 
the co-decision procedure between the European Union’s Council and the European Parliament is 
more and more used. The EU started to be developed also in hard security terms through the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It is a stable institution that was consolidated even 
deeper through the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Due to the nature of the international system, 
states still tend to distrust each other, therefore they find useful to strengthen this institution 
through structures like the European Court of Justice, the European Commission which is known 
to be the guardian of the European treaties in order to ensure themselves that the other member 
states will follow the same provision that were established during the negotiation process3. As 
                                                           
1 Gunther Hellmann; Reinhard Wolf “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO” Security 
Studies. 3:1 (1993). pp.8,10 
2 Barry Buzan (1983 revised second edition 1991). People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in 
International Relations. pp.19-20 
3 Robert Jervis. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation Understanding the Debate. 
http://www.pols.boun.edu.tr/uploads%5Cfiles%5C632.pdf accessed on 15 June 2012. pp.44-45 
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mentioned above, the gains are absolute; therefore the European states did not find enough 
incentives to defect1. Instead of that they choose to cooperate on a deeper level.  
In what regards the national preferences, as Moravcsik believed, they are established at 
the domestic level and then are negotiated by the decision-makers at the European Parliament’s 
level, or at European or Ministers’ Council level2. Here we can say that the state with the highest 
relative bargaining power3 is Germany, as it is the biggest member state of the Union and it is the 
most developed one.  
The Eastern European Frontier and the Security Dimension 
Frontiers can be seen as institutionalised forms that are ruled by the international law’s 
provisions or more specifically by the European legislation or by the national one. They can 
represent demarcation lines between two international organisation or two states, or an 
organisation and other states. Frontiers can also be seen as identity makers, taking into 
consideration the fact that within them there are stashed common identities, common values to 
which all parties accede to4. From a technical point of view, frontiers are filters through which 
individuals must pass in order to travel from a state to another. In this sense, they have to be 
organized through institutionalized rules and procedures between the direct involved parties in 
order to deal with the security problems that can arose. Maybe the most important characteristic 
of this concept is the fact that frontiers represent meeting points between different political, 
administrative, and even educational systems. These points can determine the development of 
cooperation between the parties that want to tackle together the existing and future threats or 
with their common vulnerabilities. At the opposite side it can evolve in a competitive or a point of 
friction between them5.  
In what regards the Eastern frontier of the EU, this is clearly evolving under the 
institutionalist neo-liberalism paradigm. The last three rounds of enlargement brought into its 
attention a new security architecture that needed to be taken into account in order for the 
Europeans to answer properly to the region’s specific threats and vulnerabilities. Thus, on the one 
side, we can identify member states that have expressed their national preferences towards the 
development of a relationship based on politico-economical cooperation with the Eastern 
European states that are not members of the EU. These are rather economic reason rather than 
security and strategic ones6 On the other side, we can identify the eastern states like Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia that are interested in creating and promoting a multilateral relationship 
between them and the EU in order to develop a future partnership, or even a future accession to 
                                                           
1 Scott Burchill et al. Theories of International Relations. Third edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 
http://gendocs.ru/docs/35/34939/conv_1/file1.pdf accessed on 15 June 2012. p.65 
2 Andrew Moravcsik. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998). p.24 
3 Theories of European integration. http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199544813/bache3e_ch01.pdf accessed on 
15 June 2012. pp.13-14 
4 Hastings Donnan and Thomas M Wilson, “Border: Frontier of Identity, Nation and State (Oxford, New York: Berg, 
1999) 
5 Malcolm Anderson. Border Regimes and Security in an enlarged European Community: Implication of the entry into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/1648/Anderson.pdf?sequence=1 
accessed on 15 June 2012. p.2 
6 Ioan Horga, Dorin I. Dolghi, “Security approaches at the Eastern border of the European Union”, Romanian Journal of 
Security Studies. Vol.1, no2, 2010, pp.114-130 
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the European structures. The main promoters of the Eastern frontier development inside the EU 
are the new member states that are also Eastern countries like: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
and Romania. They are also frontier states; thus, it is natural for them to have national 
preferences in this regard. In this situation we could talk about national preference in security 
terms, if we take into consideration the fact that an economic stable relationship, which is 
developed at the frontier, is intrinsically assuming a stable relationship from a security point of 
view. Additionally, as Buzan was saying, security is an expanded concept; therefore, we no longer 
see it in realist terms. Through the development of some partnership or agreements the Eastern 
states that are also frontiers of the EU want to generate a state of security and stability between 
them and the non-member states. In this context they have domestically formed their national 
preferences and started to negotiate them at the European level. In order to have an increased 
relative bargaining power, they formed coalitions in order to counter-balance the preferences that 
were coming from other European states in order promote more efficiently their preferences1. The 
result of these negotiations was the Eastern Partnership which was adopted in 2009 and which 
encompasses six eastern neighbours: Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Belarus. Also, the implementation of free trade areas, visa-free regimes and new economic 
agreements with these afore mentioned states were also followed2. Additionally, these states are 
extremely important in what regards the military and energy dimension for Europe. For example, 
Ukraine is crucial in terms of energy security taking into account the fact that through its national 
territory is passing Druzhba pipeline, which is transporting approximately 80% from the European 
gas demand3. In 2005 the EU has signed with Ukraine an Action Plan that is aimed to develop a 
relationship based on win-win cooperation through gradual economic integration and political 
cooperation4, aspects that can be found in the national preferences of the Eastern states that were 
mentioned above. Moldova is another important state for the stability and security of the Eastern 
region, especially for the Romanian state, taking into consideration that they have a direct frontier 
with each other. In this case Moldova is more like a security consumer, if we make references to 
the Transnistrian conflict5. Also in 2005 the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in 
Moldova and Ukraine was launched. Its mission is “to make a sustainable contribution to the 
development of border-management procedures that meet European Union standards and serve 
the legitimate needs of Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens, travelers, and trade, which in turn 
enhances regional security and supports economic development”6. Thus, the Eastern side of 
                                                           
1 Theories of European integration. http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199544813/bache3e_ch01.pdf accessed on 
15 June 2012. pp.13-14 
2 Ramūnas Vilpišauskas. National preferences and bargaining of the new member states since the enlargement of the 
EU into the Central and Eastern Europe: the Baltic States – policy takers, mediators, initiators? 
http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/1h_vilpisauskas.pdf accessed on 14 June 2012. p.27 
3 Daniel Hamilton; Gerhard Mangott. The New Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova http://transatlantic.sais-
jhu.edu/publications/books/new_eastern_europe_text.pdf accessed la 4 June 2012. p.2 
4 EU/Ukraine Action Plan. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf accessed on 
15 June 2012 
5 Nicu Popescu, “Noile oportunităţi de soluţionare a problemei transnistrene prin mecanismele Europei modern”, 
Institutul de Politici Publice, September 26, 2003, http://www.policy.hu/npopescu/publications/ue_trans.pdf accessed 
on la 14 June 2012. p.12 
6 The European Union Border Assistance Mission official website. http://www.eubam.org/en/about/overview 
accessed on 15 June 2012 
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Europe is very important for the security of the entire European Union and specifically for the 
Eastern states from a military, energy, political and economic point of view. In this context, a 
deeper development level of this frontier is predictable as Russia is still a major player of this 
space, its strategy having the power to influence the development of the region. 
Romania’s status ambivalence  
As a member state of NATO and of the EU, Romania has many options in promoting its 
national interest (at NATO‘s level under the neo-realist logic) or in promoting its national 
preferences (within the EU’s structures under the institutionalist neo-liberalism umbrella).  
Being an Eastern frontier state, the national interests/preferences of Romania are clearly 
headed towards the development of a stable, threats free area, in which this country or the 
international organisation that is parts of are directly interested in having close relations based on 
cooperation and dialogue with the states that are non-members. Through its foreign policy that is 
established by the decision makers at the domestic level Romania is seen and it must maintain its 
role of being “a promoter of the consolidating peace, security and stability in these areas. 
Bucharest authorities brought under regulation on juridical basis of equality and cooperation its 
relationship with the majority of states from that specific areas and it also encourages the 
development of the democratic processes from the South Caucasus region”1. 
As a member state of the EU, Romania was one of the promoters of the Eastern 
Partnership development, of the closed agreements with Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia. 
The 2008 Georgian war had a direct negative effect over the European security and over its 
economic stability. As an example, the commercial trade between Georgia and Romania 
decreased during this period “from a total of 239,4 millions $ in 2008 to 185, 2 millions $ in 2009”2. 
Having said that, Romania clearly expressed its national preferences within the EU and as a 
consequence the entire organisation intervened and succeeded in signing a six points plan with 
Russia that ceased the fire. 
Also from the national preferences perspective, the Romanian state was clearly interested 
and intensely promoted within the EU the development of a productive and efficient relationship 
with Moldova. The reasons are understandable given the fact that Romania’s border with 
Moldova’s represents 33% from its national border line. Taking into account that this is also the 
European Eastern frontier, Romania had a relative big bargaining power in this respect. This 
border is important, because after that of Hungary’s, it is intensely threatened by illegal 
trafficking, thus its underdevelopment or a low level of securitization here, represent a state of 
insecurity felt at the EU’s level, and not only at the Romanian level3.  
Regarding the Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Moldova and Romania, it 
extends far from the dual status of Romania. Romania was the first state which recognized the 
                                                           
1 Cristian Băhnăreanu. Cursa înarmărilor în arcul de insecuritate din vecinătatea estică a Uniunii Europene. Consecinţe 
pentru România. (Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare “Carol I”, 2010) Available at: 
cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/cursa_inarmarilor_in_arcul.pdf accessed on 15 June 2012. p.53 
2 Ibidem.p.56 
3 Migrants and Borders Romania and Moldova. http://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/63/82/53/PDF/EWP_migrants_borders_moldova.pdf accessed on 15 June 2012. p.3 
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independence of Moldova1. Since it entered the EU, Romania has tried to attract the Europeans’ 
attention towards the integration of Moldova. In terms of diplomacy, Bucharest has always sent 
experienced ambassadors to Chisinau, whereas other states were sending ambassadors who were 
in their early or late carriers. This proves its huge interest in developing a prolific bilateral 
relationship with Moldova2.  
Additionally, Romania was an important promoter of EU’s implication in the settlement of 
the Transnistrian conflict, where the EU is now an observer in the 5+1 negotiation format. But 
Romania has also national interests in what regards its bilateral relationship with Moldova. An 
example in this matter is the Romanian policy regarding the Romanian citizenship granting. In 
2006 (a year before Romania’s accession to the EU) “the Moldavians needed a visa and an 
invitation from a Romanian citizen, and their stay could not exceed 90 days. [......] 2009, when the 
electoral context introduced new facilitations speeding-up the process of granting the citizenship. 
Based on similar citizenship legislation from Hungary (2001), Poland (2000), Israel, Bulgaria, etc., in 
2009, the Government Ordinance 36/15.04.2009 expanded the ‘restored’ citizenship rights to third 
line relatives (instead of second line relatives as before). The capacity of processing the citizenship 
dossiers have been substantially increased by the creation o ﬁve new regional oﬃces and the 
reduction of the check deadline from six to ﬁve months. As a consequence, 25.257 persons (21.299 
Moldavians) regained the right to a Romanian citizenship in 2009, compared to a 5.590 persons, in 
2008 (4.967 Moldavians)”3, as it can be seen in the next table:  
  
This policy illustrates the strategic ambivalence of Romania because these agreements are 
strictly bilateral between Romania and Moldova and they represent strictly the Romanian national 
interest and not the will or the interest of NATO or of the EU. Moreover, they represent the effects 
of the strategic partnership between the two and they develop independently from the European 
                                                           
1 Gabriel Andreescu, Valentin Stan and Renate Weber (1994), Romania's Relations with The Republic of Moldova, 
Centre for International Studies, accessed on 2 April 2013 at: http://studint.ong.ro/moldova.htm 
2 Online Interview Nicu Popescu (2012), Nicu Popescu, cercetator la European Council on Foreign Relations: Prohorov 
nu este un om anti-Kremlin. A intrat in campanie cu acordul lui Putin, HotNews, accessed on 1 March 2013 at 
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-alegeri_rusia_2012-11690418-nicu-popescu-cercetator-european-council-foreign-
relations-discuta-online-joi-12-00-despre-alegerile-din-rusia-impactul-realegerii-lui-putin-asupra-relatiilor-politice-
internationale.htm 
3 Ibidem. pp.6-7 
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or the Euro-Atlantic will, because these two structures do not have the capabilities to restrict one 
state’s right. In this sense, national states are still the most important international players. 
Conclusions 
After 2007 the Romanian state was included in some of the most important regional 
structures, NATO and the EU, but at the same time this enlargement round brought the Europeans 
and the North Atlantics much closer to the trouble areas of Europe, the Eastern Europe, a region 
that can be characterised by instability, security consume and political regimes that do not always 
follow the principles of the liberal democratic regime as it is understood by the West. Moreover, 
the two also got very close to what Russia considers its near aboard territory, thus its negative 
reactions. This last action, under the preconditions of a neo-realist logic can transform into a 
security dilemma in which Romania will have to manage very well its options in terms of national 
interests and national preferences, as a mistake here can affect the security of the entire Eastern 
region. As a frontier state of NATO and of the EU, Romania has the responsibility and the 
opportunity to secure the area and to bring its own added value. To be able to do that, it has to 
become more active and more efficient.  
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